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The theory and practice of economic development have converged in the last two decades 
on a remarkably simple view of growth fundamentals.  Stated in its starkest form, this view is 
that economic growth requires two things: foreign technology and good institutions.  This 
perspective is well grounded in the neoclassical model of economic growth, which predicts that 
poor countries will experience rapid convergence with advanced economies once they have 
access to state-of-the-art technologies and their governments respect property rights.  From this 
perspective, failure to grow can be attributed two one or both of two pathologies.  One is the 
“closed-economy” pathology, in which governments retard technological progress by reducing 
access to foreign investment and imported capital equipment and intermediate goods.  The other 
is the “corruption” pathology, in which political leaders fail to respect property rights and screw 
things up deliberately in order to enrich themselves and their cronies.  The natural remedies for 
these pathologies are economic openness and improved governance.  With these remedies in 
place, economic growth should follow naturally.  In the words of a recent paper on growth:  
“Once a developing country government establishes the rules to a fair game and ensures their 
enforcement, it would be well advised to stand back and enjoy the self-generating growth” (Roll 
and Tallbott 2001).  Reforms in the areas of governance and openness have accordingly become 
the cornerstones of development strategy in virtually every country during the last fifteen years.   
Actual development experience presents at best an awkward fit with this conception of 
growth basics.  We point in particular to two important types of evidence that seem to us to run 
counter to the consensus view.  The first of these relates to the economic performance of Latin   2
American countries during the 1990s.  By the standards of the consensus view, the quality of 
policymaking in Latin America has been unmistakably and significantly better in the 1990s than 
it was two or three decades before.  For example, Morley et al.’s (1999) index of structural 
reform
1—measuring the degree to which government intervention has been reduced in trade, 
finance, taxation, and ownership—shows the Latin American average rising steadily from 
around 0.47 in the early 1970s (out of a maximum of one), to about 0.55 in the mid-1980s, and 
then rapidly to 0.82 in 1995.  Yet these economies’ response to the reforms has been extremely 
disappointing.  Economic growth in the 1990s has been on average much lower than in the 
decades before 1980, even though the region was closed to trade and had poorer institutions by 
most benchmarks in the earlier period.  In fact, only three Latin American countries (Chile, 
Uruguay, Argentina) have outperformed in the 1990s their record during 1950-1980.  Of these 
three, only Chile remains a clear success.  Uruguay’s performance has hardly been exemplary, as 
its growth rate looks good only in relation to an even worse performance prior to 1980.  And 
Argentina now lies in ruins.  Why is growth so low in a region that has tried so hard to adopt the 
consensus agenda?                          
The other side of the coin, and the second strand of ill-fitting evidence, is presented by 
the experience of countries that have had greater success.  Some of the most important among 
these countries—South Korea and Taiwan since the early 1960s, China since the late 1970s, and 
India since the early 1980s—have done extremely well under quite heterodox arrangements.  All 
these countries have emphasized exports and none grossly violated property rights.  But their 
strategies bear only passing similarity to today’s consensus precepts.  South Korea and Taiwan 
retained high levels of protection for a long time, and made active use of industrial policies.  
                                                 
1 Morley et al.’s index (1999) is based on Lora (1997).  See also Lora (2001). 
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When Korea was hit with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, its economy had so many 
institutional weaknesses by orthodox standards that many observers located the crisis’ roots in 
Korea’s “governance” problems.  China achieved phenomenal growth rates without formally 
enacting private property rights—something that would have seemed impossible to many 
economists had the Chinese miracle not taken place.  India barely reformed its incredibly 
cumbersome trade and industrial regime before its economy took off in the 1980s.  And even 
after more ambitious reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, the Indian economy remained 
among the world’s most protected.  Of course heterodoxy did not produce payoffs everywhere.  
Most countries with protected economies and poor protection of property rights languished or 
retrogressed.  But the fact that the world’s most successful economies during the last four 
decades prospered doing things that are more commonly associated with failure is something that 
cannot be easily dismissed.      
We present here a different perspective on economic development, one that has more 
room for the Latin American and Asian “anomalies” noted above.  Our focus is on a particular 
type of learning that we believe has not received enough attention in the literature on economic 
development: learning what one is good at producing.
2  We emphasize that this a key challenge 
in the process of transformation into a modern economy.  Neither economic theory nor 
management science is of much help in helping entrepreneurs (or the state) choose appropriate 
investments among the full range of modern-sector activities, of which there could be tens of 
thousands, once one moves beyond broad categories such as “labor-intensive products” or 
“natural-resource based products.”  Yet making the right investment decisions is key to future 
                                                 
2 For a paper that is focused on learning about the institutions that are appropriate to the local setting, see Mukand 
and Rodrik (2002). 
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growth, as it determines the pattern of specialization.
3  In these circumstances, there is great 
social value to discovering that cut flowers, soccer balls, or computer software can be produced 
at low cost, because this knowledge can orient the investments of other entrepreneurs.  But the 
initial entrepreneur who makes the “discovery” can capture only a small part of the social value 
that this knowledge generates.  As the cases we shall discuss in the empirical section of the paper 
reveal, other entrepreneurs can quickly emulate such discoveries.  Consequently, 
entrepreneurship of this type—learning what can be produced—will typically be undersupplied, 
and economic transformation delayed.  
This perspective differs from the standard view in an important way.  In the neoclassical 
model, it is presumed that the production functions all extant goods are common knowledge.  
Our starting point is that this is not a good assumption for developing countries.  Much 
technology is “tacit,” meaning that it cannot be easily codified into blueprints that allow easy 
application (Nelson 1990, Evenson and Westphal 1995, Lall 2000).  Moreover, even when the 
production techniques used in the advanced countries are transparent to outsiders, their transfer 
to new economic and institutional environments typically require adaptations with uncertain 
degrees of success.
4  This is an aspect of technology transfer that is amply documented in the 
literature.  In their survey on technology transfer, for example, Evenson and Westphal (1995) 
                                                 
3 This kind of indeterminacy of specialization is different from the indeterminacy that originates from scale 
economies or learning-by-doing.  The latter are the subject of Gomory and Baumol (2000): “Today there is not one 
uniquely determined best economic outcome based on national advantages.  Today’s global economy does not 
single out a single best outcome, arrived at by international competition, in which each country serves the world’s 
best interests by producing just those goods that it can naturally turn out most efficiently.  Rather, there are many 
possible outcomes that depend on what countries actually choose to do, what capabilities, natural or human, they 
actually develop.”  (Gomory and Baumol 2000, 5, emphasis in the original).    
  
4 For an important theoretical analysis of “learning to learn,” and how its presence may be responsible both for lack 
of convergence across countries and for specialization in production, see Stiglitz (1987).  Zeira’s (1987) model of 
investment, in which a firm does not know its profit function and can discover it only through investment, come 
especially close to capturing the essence of our approach.  In our model, unlike in Zeira’s, knowledge acquired in 
the process of discovering one’s costs spills over to other potential entrepreneurs.         
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emphasize the role of domestic tinkering in the successful adoption of foreign technology.  They 
list such adaptations as “technological efforts related to raw material control, product and process 
quality control, production scheduling, repair and maintenance, changes in production mix, as 
well as others including episodic trouble-shooting to overcome problems encountered in the 
course of operations” (1995, 2249).
5  We shall discuss these issues at greater length when we 
turn to empirical evidence.      
If learning what a country is good at producing requires an investment and the returns to 
that investment cannot be fully appropriated, the problem faced by potential entrepreneurs in 
developing countries is identical to the problem faced by innovators in the advanced industrial 
countries.  However, the policy environments facing the “innovators” in the two settings are 
quite different.  Typically, the intellectual property regime protects discoverers of new goods 
through the issuance of temporary monopolies, i.e., patents.  But the investor in the developing 
country who figures out that an existing good can be produced profitably at home does not 
normally get such protection, no matter how high the social return.
6  Indeed, ease of entry by 
competitors (i.e., imitators) is normally judged to be an important indicator of how well markets 
function—the lower the barriers to entry, the better.  Free entry makes the non-appropriability 
problem worse, and undercuts the incentive to invest in discovering what a country is good at 
producing.  Laissez-faire cannot be the optimal solution under these circumstances, just as it is 
not in the case of R&D in new products.   
                                                 
5 Another source of uncertainty is about trading possibilities--whether there is adequate demand out there for a 
particular product, for example.  This type of informational problem is discussed in Rauch and Watson (2001) in 
their model of “international trade intermediaries,” and “network intermediation.” Such entrepreneurship may be 
under-supplied because intermediaries may not have enough incentive to maintain and expand their informational 
networks. 
 
6 As Evenson and Westphal (1995) note, the kind of local adaptations that are normally required  “are seldom 
associated with inventions that are patentable abroad.  They do not yield improvements that are sufficiently 
inventive relative to the known state of the art” (1995, 2249). 
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We develop a general-equilibrium framework in the next section to clarify the analytical 
and normative issues.  We begin with a small open economy that is initially specialized in 
traditional activities where there is no uncertainty.  There also exist a large number of modern 
activities, as yet not exploited, all of which have an uncertain productivity.  In the first period, 
entrepreneurs have the option of setting up a “firm” of a fixed size and discovering the true costs 
of production in the specific activity they have invested.  In the second period, they can operate 
as a monopoly, and choose to do so if their costs turn out to be lower than the relevant world 
price.  In the third period, costs of all active firms become common knowledge and there is free 
entry, eliminating (through adjustments in wages) all excess profits.  We characterize in this 
setting both the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum (in which the social planner can 
allocate resources at will, but has no more information than is available to the private sector).  
We highlight two failures of the laissez-faire outcome: there is too little investment and 
entrepreneurship in the first period (unless the second period is “very long”), and too much 
production diversification in the second.  Optimal policy consists of counteracting these 
distortions: to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante, but to rationalize production 
ex post.   
  Let us now return to the anomalies that we used to motivate this paper.  What does our 
framework have to say about the possible causes of the disappointing Latin American 
performance?  Our model offers three clues as to why the investment response may have been 
anemic despite increased openness and improved institutions.  First, and most significantly, the 
binding constraints to growth may have been elsewhere.  Entrepreneurship may have been 
constrained by inadequate inducements to discover costs in new activities (given that the private 
returns to such investments lie far below social returns), and not by inadequate property rights or   7
lack of access to imported technologies.  Second, to the extent that market-oriented reforms have 
increased the mobility of firms, they may have actually reduced incentives to invest in new 
activities.  Ease of entry speeds up emulation, and reduces the appropriability of cost discoveries.  
In fact, if this is the case, reforms have a bigger payoff in the short run than in the long run: new 
entrants exploit the benefits of past cost discoveries, but once these are exhausted, the economy 
is dragged down by the lower efforts in innovation.
7  Third, to the extent that the reforms have 
increased productivity in traditional sectors alongside potential new activities, they may have 
increased the resource cost of entrepreneurship in the modern sectors.  What we can say, at the 
very least, is that the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have paid scant attention to the problem of 
spurring investment in non-traditional activities when returns to entrepreneurship in such 
activities are subject to non-appropriability for reasons that we highlight in this paper.         
With regard to Asia, our framework helps us understand why the provision of rents by 
governments (through trade protection, temporary monopolies, subsidized credits, and tax 
incentives) has gone hand in hand with industrial growth and diversification.  These rents may 
have been needed to stimulate the cost discovery process.  Detailed accounts documenting these 
rents in South Korea and Taiwan (see for example Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, and Evans 1995) 
are otherwise impossible to square with the conventional understanding of what constitutes 
desirable economic policies.  At the same time, our framework highlights how rents can backfire 
if governments do not complement them with policies that rationalize industries and discipline 
firms that end up with high costs.  We would hypothesize that the absence of such discipline was 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with the evidence from Latin America.  Initial estimates of the growth effects of reforms 
(Easterly, Loayza and Montiel 1997, Lora and Barrera 1997, and Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 1997) found 
relatively large and permanent effects. Using more recent data, Lora (2002) finds that the growth payoff to reform is 
smaller and more transitory than originally estimated.  
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a hallmark of import substitution policies (ISI) in Latin America.  We will come back to this 
distinction after we develop our analytical framework.     
  The outline of the paper is as follows.  We describe and analyze the formal framework in 
the next section.  Following a policy discussion, we then turn to some suggestive empirical 
evidence.  We provide evidence on three aspects of our framework in particular.  First, we show 
that there is a large element of uncertainty at a disaggregated level as to what a country will be 
good at producing.  Second, we discuss evidence relating to the difficulties entailed in importing 
technology off-the-shelf.  Third, we summarize some case studies of domestic technology 
diffusion from successful incumbents to emulators.   
 
Conceptual framework 
  We embed our policy analysis in a model of a small open economy with two sectors, 
modern and traditional.  We distinguish between these two sectors according to whether costs of 
production are known.  The modern sector is made up of n goods that are not currently produced, 
and the costs of which are discovered only after production is attempted.  Letting ci denote unit 
costs of production of good i, we assume that costs depend on unobserved productivity 
parameter θi in the following manner: 






=   
where w is the wage rate and b/θi is the number of workers needed to produce a single unit of the 
good i.  We have in mind many different types of uncertainty: producing a good that has not 
been locally produced previously requires learning about how to combine different inputs in the 
right way, figuring out whether local conditions are conducive to efficient production, and 
discovering the true costs of production.  We use uncertainty over θi  as a proxy for all this.  We   9
assume that the ex-ante distribution of θi is uniform over the interval [0, 1] and that the θi are 
i.i.d. across the n sectors.  Note that modern-sector production uses only labor and has constant-
returns to scale technology once productivity is known.   
The unobserved productivity parameters θi  is a property of the individual goods, and not 
of entrepreneurs: all entrepreneurs who run firms producing good i will operate with productivity 
θi.  We shall assume that each modern-sector firm is of a given size, fixed (by appropriate choice 
of units) to one unit of good i’s output.  Each entrepreneur can run one, and no more than one, 
modern-sector firm.   
Discovering θi requires setting up the firm, which in turn entails the hiring of b units of 
labor.  In this initial stage (period 1), the firm produces nothing.  Let m denote the number of 
entrepreneurs who choose to establish firms in period 1.  The total amount of (sunk) investment 
in the first period is correspondingly mbw.  We will refer to m interchangeably as the quantity of 
“investment” or “entrepreneurship.”   
  In period 2, θi become known for those m goods in which investments have been made.  
Entrepreneurs have the option of producing a unit of the good and earning p (an exogenous price 
fixed on world markets
8), or, if unit costs bw/θi turn out to be larger than p, to close the firm at 
no extra cost.  In this period, there is no entry into the modern sector so that entrepreneurs who 
produce will earn excess profits.  (Even though p is fixed, so is output thanks to the assumptions 
that firm size is fixed and an entrepreneur cannot run more than a single firm.)  This transitional 
period of monopoly profits can be motivated in one of two ways.  It could be that it takes time 
                                                 
8 Note that these are goods that are already being produced in other, more advanced countries.  So saying that there 
are well-known, fixed prices is not at odds with the assumption that none of them are being produced at home 
currently. 
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for the θi to become common knowledge.  Alternatively, θi can be immediately known, but it 
could take time for an “imitator” to set up a firm.  We denote the length of period 2 as T. 
  Finally, in period 3 (which lasts until infinity), there is free entry into the modern sector, 
and excess profits are eliminated.  The latter happens in our case via upward adjustments in the 
wage rate w.   
  The model is closed by describing production in the traditional sector.  We assume that 
the traditional sector operates under constant returns to scale, and employs labor and a fixed 
factor.  It will be convenient to use a specific functional form, so we write the production 
function in the traditional sector as y = ( s l − )
α , where l is the total labor force of the economy, 
s is employment in the modern sector, and α is the factor share of labor in the traditional sector.  
The diminishing marginal returns to labor in the traditional sector implies that the modern sector 
faces a positively-sloped labor supply curve.  Adjustments in wages will therefore play an 
important equilibrating role for our economy.  We assume that n is small relative to l , so that we 
do not have to keep track of the implications for the labor force as the number of entrepreneurs, 
m, varies.  The price of the traditional sector is fixed at 1 as the numeraire.      
  Social optimality: The full-information case.  Consider first the case of an omniscient 
social planner, who not only can allocate production at will, but also has full knowledge of the θi 
for all the sectors without any prior investment.  The full-information social optimum is easy to 
describe.  Rank modern-sector goods by their θi , and let θ
max denote the highest θi .  Let h(s) 
denote the value marginal product of labor in the traditional sector (h(s) = α( s l − )
α-1).  Then the 
optimum is characterized by the following three conditions: 





s = l  (full specialization in good with θi = θ
max);   11
(2b)   l s h
b
p
l h ≤ ≤ ⇒ ≥ ≥ 0 ) 0 ( ) (
max θ
; 





s = 0 (full specialization in the traditional sector). 
For modern-sector production to be viable, labor productivity in the good with θ
max must be high 
enough that condition (2c)—value marginal product of labor in the traditional sector exceeds that 
in the modern sector even when the economy is completely specialized in the former sector—can 
be ruled out.  We assume this is the case.  This leaves the other two possibilities, where the 
economy either fully specializes in the θ
max sector (2a), or is diversified between this and the 
traditional sector (2b).  Note that due to constant costs in the modern sector, it never pays for the 
social planner to operate any modern-sector good with θi < θ
max.  If the modern-sector is active, 
the optimal thing to do is to concentrate all resources in the θ
max sector until either wages rise 
sufficiently to equate the marginal value product of labor in the traditional sector or all labor is 
exhausted.   
  Social optimality: Incomplete information.  Now turn to a more realistic social planning 
problem, where the planner can still allocate resources at will, but has to incur the same learning 
costs as private entrepreneurs do.  The planner has to decide how many investments, m, to 
undertake in period 1.  Each modern-sector good is ex-ante identical with an expected  θ = ½.  
However, once the productivity parameters of m of the goods are revealed, only the one with the 
highest θi will matter:  as before, the social planner will never want to produce a modern good 
with a lower θi  than the maximum that is already known.  So what matters to the planner is not 
the expected θi (which is independent of m), but the maximum of m draws (which does depend 
on m).  Let the latter be denoted by  ) (
max m θ .  Since the ex-ante distribution of θi is uniform over   12
[0, 1] and the draws are independent, the expected value of the rank statistic  ) (
max m θ has the 
simple form E( ) (
max m θ ) ≡  ) (m θ
)
= m/(1+m).  We note that  ) (m θ
)
 is increasing in m, but at a 
decreasing rate ( 0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' < > m m θ θ ).  So the social planner gains by increasing investment in 
first period learning, but there exist diminishing returns.        
  In period 1, mb units of labor are allocated to “investment” (s1
 = mb, where a subscript 
denotes the time period).  First-period output is therefore: 
(3)    
α β ) ( ) ( 1 1 mb l s l y − = − =  
Productivity in the modern sector on periods 2 and 3 is not known for sure ex ante, so a risk-
neutral social planner will use the expected productivity  ) (m θ
)
 to anticipate the future labor 
market equilibrium.  Labor allocation will be determined by setting the value marginal product 
of labor equal in the two sectors in expected terms: 











Since the social planner will allow free entry starting from period 2 (and not period 3, as in the 
decentralized case), there is no distinction between periods 2 and 3 in the social planning 
problem, so we use the subscript “2” denote outcomes in both periods.   Note also that we are 
assuming a diversified equilibrium (corresponding to case 2(b) above).  Equation (3) implicitly 
defines s2 as an increasing function of m.  Using (3), the (expected) outputs of the modern (x) and 
traditional (y) sectors can be expressed in turn by 
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Since the social planner faces an intertemporal trade-off, we need to specify a discount 
rate.   For reasons that will become clear later, it is convenient for our purposes to specify the 
discounting in the following way.  Let the discount factor between period 1 and 2 be given by δ, 
while the instantaneous discount rate is ρ.  We shall express the present discounted value from 
the vantage point of period 1 of a stream of continuous payments K that are received during 
period 2 and 3 as δK/ρ .  (Obviously, δ  is a function of both ρ  and the “length” of period 1.  
Since we treat both of the latter as constants, there is no harm in treating δ as a constant as well.)  
The social planner’s maximand can now be written as the present discounted value of 
production evaluated at world prices: 
(7)     () 2 2 1 max px y y W




with y1, y2, and x2 as defined in (3), (5), and (6).  The associated first-order condition is given by: 
(8)     , 0 ) ( ) ( ' ˆ 1
2 = − −
− α α θ
ρ
δ
mb l b m s
b
p
   
where s2 is as defined implicitly by (4).  The first term in this equation expresses the marginal 
benefit of first-period investment: an increase in m increases expected future productivity in the 
modern sector, a gain that is spread over the equilibrium level of future employment in the 
modern sector (s2).  The latter feature introduces an element of increasing returns to scale to 
investment, since s2 is itself an increasing function of m.  The countervailing forces are the 
diminishing return to  ) (m θ
)
 and the rising marginal cost of drawing labor away from the 
traditional sector (captured by the second term in (8)).  We assume these countervailing forces 
dominate, so that the second-order condition is satisfied and we have an interior solution.  It is 
easy to verify, under these conditions, that the social planner’s choice of m, as defined implicitly 
by (8), is increasing in p and decreasing in b.            14
 Decentralized  equilibrium.  We now characterize the market equilibrium under the 
conditions discussed previously, namely that the entrepreneurship decision is decentralized and 
there is no entry (“imitation”) during period 2.  That means that any entrepreneur who decides to 
produce in period 2 earns a monopoly profit during the length T of the second period.  Since the 
expected productivity is θ = ½, expected profits equal π = 2
2 2bw p
bw
p − = −
θ
, where w2 is the 
(expected) equilibrium wage that prevails in period 2.  The present discounted value of these 





δ ρ ) ( 1 T R e
T ≡ −
− , with 
R(0)=0, 0<R(T)<1, and R’(T)>0.  Under free entry, expected profits are just offset by the 
investment cost that each entrepreneur incurs in setting up a firm in period 1.  The condition for 
zero-profits ex ante is therefore given by: 
(9)     0 ) 2 )( ( 1 2 ≤ − − bw bw p T R
ρ
δ
,        
with the equation holding as an equality whenever m>0.  Even though m does not appear 
explicitly here, this equation determines the quantity of aggregate investment since m affects the 
level of wages in periods 1 and 2 through the labor-market constraint.   
The labor-market clearing equation for period 1 is: 




α α mb l w . 
To determine the corresponding equation for period 2, we need to know the proportion of 
investments that actually lead to production.  Once bw is sunk, an entrepreneur will choose to 
remain in the modern sector as long revenues cover variable costs.  Denote by θ
~
the limit 
productivity such that this is true, i.e. 
p
bw2 ~
= θ .  All entrepreneurs who draw  θ θ
~
≥ i will choose   15
to produce in the second period.  Therefore the expected level of employment in the modern 
sector in period 2 is  mb
p
bw




2 − = − = θ .  The labor-market equilibrium in this period 
can then be written as 
(11)    
1
2













l w . 
Equations (9), (10), and (11) determine the three endogenous variables in the system, m, w1, and 
w2.   
Outcomes in period 3 can be determined separately, but are not needed for our purposes.  
We just note that with free entry in the third period, all but the highest productivity firm close 
down, and imitation drives profits in that activity down to zero.  The mechanism that achieves 
rationalization of production is this:  lower productivity activities are driven out as wages get bid 
up by the entry of more firms into the highest-productivity activity.  Since entrepreneurs make 
zero profits in period 3, the investment level is determined only by outcomes in periods 1 and 2.       
  We now discuss the salient features of the decentralized equilibrium.  First, note from (9) 
that m=0 for T sufficiently close to zero.  The interpretation is straightforward: entrepreneurs 
earn monopoly profits only during the duration of the second period.  If the length of this period 
shrinks to zero, there is no incentive to invest in discovering costs.  If imitation is immediate, the 
equilibrium level of investment and entrepreneurship is zero.  Second, over the range of T for 
which m>0, m, w1, and w2 are all increasing in T.  That is, investment increases as the monopoly 
period is extended.  Third, as long as monopoly prevails, modern-sector production is diversified 
and does not specialize in the good with the highest (known) productivity.  Once imitation kicks 
in with free entry, production in the modern sector is rationalized and only highest-productivity 
activity survives.    16
Compared to the social optimum discussed previously, therefore, the decentralized 
equilibrium suffers from two distinct inefficiencies.  First, the level of investment and 
entrepreneurship in the market equilibrium (call it m
c) does not coincide with that required for 
social optimum (call it m
*).  This can be verified easily by comparing the first-order condition of 
the social planner (eq. 8) with the free entry condition of market equilibrium (eq. 9).  Note that 
the second term is the same for the two equations (substitute (10) into (9)), but that the first, 
capturing the benefits of investment, differ.  The planner cares about the economy-wide benefits, 
while the entrepreneur cares about monopoly profits.  Where m
c stands in relation to m
* is 
ambiguous in general.  If monopoly profits are short-lived (T is small), then m
c < m
*, and there is 
too little investment and too few entrepreneurs in the market equilibrium.  This is the case that 
motivates the analysis of this paper.  On the other hand, if free entry is delayed for very long (T 
is large), then m
c > m
*, and there is over-investment motivated by the pursuit of monopoly 
profits.                        
The second source of inefficiency is the existence of monopoly power in period 2.  In our 
framework, the costs of monopoly arise not from price-setting behavior (which is constrained by 
the small-open economy assumption), but from the fact that restricted entry yields too little 
specialization within the modern sector.  Monopoly prevents the flow of resources into the 
highest-productivity activity, and allows activities that will not eventually survive to do so.   
The bottom line of the framework is that as long as T is non-zero but not too large, the 
laissez-faire equilibrium delivers (a) too little investment and entrepreneurship, and (b) too much 
production diversification in the modern sector. 
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Policy issues 
The key policy recommendation that comes out of our framework is that governments 
need to play a dual role in fostering industrial growth and transformation.  They need to 
encourage entrepreneurship and investment in new activities ex ante, but push out unproductive 
firms and sectors ex post.  This is of course easier said than done.  The specifics of how this can 
be managed is likely to differ considerably from country to country, depending on administrative 
capability, the prevailing incentive regime, the flexibility of the fiscal system, the degree of 
sophistication of the financial sector, and the underlying political economy.  Governments 
without adequate capacity to exercise leadership over their private sectors are likely to mess 
things up rather than do better.  But there are examples to suggest that the job can be done.    
In attempting to promote innovation, governments have used a variety of instruments 
such as trade protection, public sector credit, tax holidays, and investment and export subsidies.  
Clearly, all appropriate policy interventions need to increase the expected pay-off to innovation. 
However, interventions typically create other distortions.  For example, they may lower θ
~
by 
making less productive activities privately profitable, inefficiently increasing the heterogeneity 
of the modern sector.  Moreover, if the instrument does not adequately discriminate between 
innovators and copycats, it will promote early entry, thus limiting the benefits to innovators 
while increasing the social cost of the intervention since copycats will get part of the resources 
transferred.  
Interventions can be further classified in two groups, depending on whether they 
compensate innovators in case they fail (i.e. in case they draw a low θ ), or increase the payoff in 
case they successful. The first type of interventions is likely to create moral hazard, but the 
second type will not help those who lack the resources to finance activities in period 1.    18
Thus, for example, temporary trade protection is far from an ideal instrument. It may 
increase expected profits of innovators, but it does so only for firms selling in the local market. 
Moreover, since it does not discriminate between innovators or copycats, it promotes early entry, 
thus lowering the expected payoff to innovation while inefficiently channeling resources to 
copycats. Moreover, as protection gets extended to intermediate goods, innovation will tend to 
focus on domestic markets, instead of new export activities. Since domestic markets are small 
relative to world markets, the social returns to innovation are likewise smaller. Hence, trade 
protection is not an efficient way of promoting self-discovery.  
Export subsidies avoid the anti-export bias of trade protection, but do not discriminate 
between innovators and copycats. They also lower θ
~
, promoting excessive diversification. One 
advantage of exports subsidies is that they can be relatively good at discriminating between 
successful and unsuccessful performers ex post.  Low-cost producers are more likely to incur the 
sunk costs of exporting.  Therefore providing subsidies contingent on exporting can allow policy 
makers to sort out firms and sectors that are high productivity from those that aren’t.  This 
strategy was actively used by the South Korean and Taiwanese governments during their 
industrial drives in the 1960s and 1970s.     
By contrast, public sector credit or guarantees operate by transferring part of the risk of 
failure to the government: if the project is successful, the loan gets repaid; if it is not, then the 
firm will default.  Credit has the advantage that it can be made discretionary and thus, it can be 
targeted on innovators and not to copycats. In fact, in Latin America during the heyday of 
industrial policy, it was common for development banks to require that no other domestic 
supplier existed before granting financial support. When market reforms were introduced in the 
early 1990s, this policy was seen as particularly inadequate: it limited entry and competition.   19
However, in the context of our model, this is precisely what is needed: public resources should 
be concentrated on the first entrants.  Moreover, judgment can be used in choosing ideas that 
promise the greater social benefits.  However, with discretion come problems of political 
influence, corruption or at least moral hazard.  
Policy instruments can also differ with respect to elements that are required to impose 
discipline. For example, tariff protection and export subsidies need to be taken away at some 
point in time. The latter will be under fiscal and international pressure to disappear. The former 
may require more political effort. Firms used to government loans need to be let go: at some 
point in time loans cannot be rolled over forever and the firm needs to be required to return the 
loan or declare default.  A brief summary of the costs and benefits of these different types of 


























































What stands out in many discussions of East Asia is how governments in the region were 
unusually good at supplying the requisite discipline:    20
Where Korea differs from other developing countries in promoting big business was the 
discipline the state exercised over these chaebols by penalizing poor performance and 
rewarding only good ones… The government as the controller of commercial banks was 
in a powerful position to punish poorly managed firms by freezing bank credit.  As a 
result only three of the largest 10 chaebols in 1965—Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, ans 
Ssangyong—remained on the same list 10 years later.  Similarly, seven of the largest 10 
in 1975 remained on the same list in 1985.” (Kim 1993, 363). 
 
The Korean government was quick to shelve its plans for supporting particular firms or 
industries when new information suggested that productivity would lag (Westphal 1981, 34).  
The development of textile industry in Taiwan in the 1950s provides a particularly clear example 
of the strategy suggested by our framework.  The Taiwanese government subsidized entry into 
the industry by supplying inputs and spinning mills, providing working capital, imposing import 
restrictions, and buying up the resulting production.  Local production grew spectacularly as a 
result.  But the government also subsequently restricted entry and tried to prune the non-
productive firms (see Evans 1995, 57, and Wade 1990, 79).  Japan used a similar combination of 
state promotion/protection followed by rationalization in the computer industry (Evans 1995, 
101).        
Consider on the other hand Latin America during its import-substituting industrialization 
(ISI) period.  Latin American ISI produced many successful firms, but also an industrial structure 
that was too diversified—too many low productivity firms alongside the high performers (see for 
example Dahlman and Frischtak 1993, 424-5).  Discipline was to come to Latin America in the 
1990s in the form of trade openness, and many of the low-productivity firms were eventually 
driven out.  Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile deepened their specialization in 
capital-intensive, natural resource based industries, while others like Mexico and the smaller 
Central American countries increased their focus on assembly industries servicing the U.S. 
market (Katz 2001).  But, as our framework suggests, openness and institutional reform were not   21
enough to spark a significant new wave of entrepreneurship and investment in non-traditional 
activities.  
A crude, but useful characterization of the policy environments in East Asia and Latin 
America, as viewed from the perspective of our framework, would be as follows.  East Asian 
governments provided their firms during the 1960s and 1970s with both promotion (the carrot) 
and discipline (the stick).  Against this benchmark, Latin American industrial performance has 
fallen short because of varying shortcomings.  Under ISI, Latin America was marked by plenty 
of promotion, but too little discipline.  In the 1990s, Latin America has considerable discipline 




It is difficult to provide direct empirical evidence for the model we have developed here 
because much of our story has to do with outcomes that are not observed: the failure to develop 
non-traditional activities because of inadequate incentives to invest in learning what one is good 
at producing.  Our argument rests on the idea that the returns to entrepreneurship of this 
particular kind are easily competed away by free entry.  Looking for systematic evidence that 
successful investments are rapidly copied is a self-defeating strategy because there shouldn’t be 
much evidence of this sort to the extent that our model does capture an important part of reality.  
Entrepreneurial initiatives of this kind should tend to remain episodic, almost random events—
not systematic ones.  We shall discuss a number of such cases below.  Similarly, if we were to 
learn that many successful new firms from developing countries operate with technologies that 
are hard to copy or have devised successful strategies of product differentiation (with protection   22
against entry imitative entry)
9, this apparently contradictory finding may in fact be quite 
consistent with our model.  After all, a direct implication of our argument is that only 
investments that provide such protection will be undertaken in equilibrium.   
So we are forced to take an indirect route to the empirical evidence.  We proceed by 
providing support separately for three propositions that we consider to be building blocks for our 
argument.  First, there is a large element of uncertainty as to what a country will be good at 
producing, once we move beyond broad aggregates such as “labor-intensive manufactures” to 
specific products.  Second, there are significant difficulties entailed in importing technology off-
the-shelf, with successful local adaptation requiring considerable domestic tinkering.  Third, 
domestic imitation often proceeds quite rapidly when the first two difficulties are overcome, 
bidding away the rents of the early incumbents.  None these propositions is individually 
controversial.  As we highlight below, it is easy to find broad support for all of them in the 
literatures on international trade, technology transfer, and economic history.   
 
Predicting comparative advantage 
The factor-endowments model is reasonably good at predicting the broad structure of 
comparative advantage for developing countries.  Leamer’s (1984) classic work, for example, 
shows that the pattern of global commodity trade is well explained by the distribution of resource 
endowments across countries.  In this work, Leamer aggregates traded products into 10 
commodities (petroleum, raw materials, forest products, tropical agriculture, animal products, 
cereals, labor intensive, capital intensive, machinery, and chemicals) and factors of production 
into 11 resources (capital, three types of labor, four types of land, coal, minerals, and oil).  Wood 
                                                 
9 See for example the discussion of Spain’s sparkling wine and publishing industries in Guillén (2001, chap. 4). 
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and Mayer (1999) and Mayer and Wood (1999) show that the developing countries’ pattern of 
specialization--labor-intensive manufactures versus natural resource-based products--depends 
critically on their ratio of human capital endowment to land. 
However, for entrepreneurs trying to decide what they should invest in, these kinds of 
findings are hardly helpful.  Consider the information technology sector in India, which 
represents a shining example of technological success in a low-income country.  The industry 
has grown from a very modest base in the early 1980s to export more than $6 billion of software 
by 2000.  Yet India is a country that one would have hardly expected to have a comparative 
advantage in a technology-intensive sector (Kapur 2002).  India ranks low in terms of 
conventional indicators of IT penetration, has failed to develop leadership in other high-tech 
sectors, and is relatively well endowed in unskilled (rather than skilled) workers.  Until recently, 
government policies have not been particularly friendly to investors in that sector.  Yet 
Bangalore-based companies like Infosys and Wipro have managed to create successful business 
models that have been widely emulated not only by other local entrepreneurs, but also by foreign 
companies investing in India.   
After the fact, it is not difficult to enumerate some of the features that account for this 
success: the time-zone difference that allows the processing to be done in Bangalore before the 
West Coast of the U.S. is back at work in the morning, the linkages with the Indian diaspora in 
Silicon Valley, the facility with the English language, the establishment of the Indian Institutes 
of Technology, and even the departure of IBM in the late 1970s which gave Indian engineers a 
head-start with UNIX-based software development (Kapur 2002).  Ex ante, however, few of 
these advantages were as visible.  As Narayana Murthy, who founded Infosys with six other   24
software professionals in 1981, once put it to an interviewer, “[our] objective was to conduct an 
experiment ….”  (Nasdaq International Magazine 1999, emphasis added).   
Even if we consider IT in India as an anomaly, the predictions of the factor-endowments 
are too coarse to have much operational value.  Knowing that Bangladesh’s comparative 
advantage lies in labor-intensive manufactures and not in high-tech machinery is useful for sure, 
but that still leaves hundreds, if not thousands, of different types of activity up for grabs.  The 
six-digit Harmonized Schedule (HS), which most countries use to assess customs duties, 
comprises around 5,000 different commodity groups.  The United States reports its trade 
statistics in an even more detailed form, using a 10-digit system resulting in about 8,000 
commodity groups.  These statistical conventions reflect the tremendous variety of products that 
are “out there” and which newcomers could in principle invest in.  Neither trade theorists nor 
management consultants can be good guides as to whether Bangladesh should produce hats or it 
should produce bed sheets instead.  There is much randomness in the process of discovering 
what one can be good at.  Evenson and Westphal (1995) summarize the firm-level studies thus: 
 
...the body of case study research and anecdotal evidence includes numerous cases of 
failure to achieve the minimum mastery needed to attain the levels of productivity 
expected when the physical investment was undertaken.  It also includes numerous cases 
of unforeseen success in achieving sufficient mastery to exceed the expected levels of 
productivity.  In the former cases there is no technological development to benefit from 
subsequent investments in implementing the same or similar technology.  In the latter 
cases there is technological development so that subsequent investments are implemented 
with increasing efficiency due to the spillovers from previous experience. (1995, 2262-
63) 
 
  As it turns out, Bangladesh is very good at producing hats—more specifically “hats and 
other headgear, knitted or from textile material not in strips” (HS 650590)—which constitute 
Bangladesh’s third most important export item to the U.S. after men’s cotton shirts and trousers.  
And it is not very good at producing bedsheets—specifically  “bedsheets, pillowcases and bed   25
linen (incl. sets) – woven, not printed – cotton” (HS 630231)—of which it exports only a 
miniscule amount.  Is this a predictable result of innate comparative advantage?  Consider 
Pakistan, which is not too dissimilar to Bangladesh in its economic circumstances.  Pakistan 
exports a large quantity of bedsheets, but few hats.  Since these commodities are fairly 
standardized and labor-intensive, it is difficult to believe that the resource endowments and cost 
structures of the two countries predispose them in any predictable way to specialize in one but 
not the other.  More likely, existing patterns of specialization are the consequence of historical 
accidents and serendipitous choices by entrepreneurs.   
  The case of hats and bedsheets constitutes not the exception but the rule.  Table 1 lists the 
top 25 export items for Bangladesh and Pakistan in the U.S. market, to make the point that the 
export structures of these two similar countries are surprisingly different at the level of 6-digit 
HS categories.  In fact, only six products are in the top 25 for both countries (these are identified 
by bold letters).  Among Pakistan’s major exports, curtains (HS 630392) and soccer balls (HS 
950662) are some others that Bangladesh exports either very little or none at all.   
  We repeat the exercise in Tables 2 and 3 for two other pairs of countries in different parts 
of the world and at different levels of incomes: Honduras versus the Dominican Republic and 
Taiwan versus South Korea.  Once again, these are pairs of countries that would be expected to 
have fairly similar patterns of specializations.  At a sufficiently aggregated level, that is certainly 
true.  Honduras and the Dominican Republic concentrate on garment exports, while Taiwan and 
Korea focus on computer products.  But at the level of individual products, there are again 
striking differences.  In 2000, the Dominican Republic exported $119 million worth of footwear 
uppers (HS 640610) to the U.S. while Honduras exported none.  Honduras is a major exporter of 
ignition wiring sets (HS 854430) whereas the Dominican Republic barely exports any.  Taiwan   26
exported $279 million worth of bicycles to the U.S. against Korea’s $623 thousand.  Korea 
exports a lot of air conditioning machines; Taiwan very few.  The overlap among the top 25 
exports of these two pairs is somewhat larger than in the case of Bangladesh/Pakistan, but far 
from overwhelming—9 out of 25 for Honduras/Dominican Republic and 10 out of 25 for 
Taiwan/South Korea.
10 
  Suppose we take export performance in different product categories as a measure of a 
country’s relative productivity across these categories.  Then these statistics reveal that the range 
of products countries end up becoming good at producing is quite narrow.  Exports are typically 
highly concentrated, even in rich and relatively diversified countries.  This is shown in Figure 1, 
which displays the cumulative share of the top export items for the six countries mentioned 
above.  The figure also includes German exports for comparison purposes.  The top 4 export 
commodities account for around 40 percent of South Korea’s and Honduras’ total exports to the 
U.S. market, and 30 percent of the other countries’.  The cumulative share of the top 25 export 
items ranges from a high of 83 percent for Honduras to a low of 43 percent for Germany, with 
the figure for all others lying above 60 percent (save for Taiwan). 
  The message we take from these numbers is twofold.  First, for all economies except 
possibly the most sophisticated, industrial success entails concentration in a relatively narrow 
range of high-productivity activities.  Second, the specific product lines that eventually prove to 
be hits are typically highly uncertain and unpredictable. 
 
                                                 
10 Edward N. Wolf reports a related finding in chapter 11 of Gomory and Baumol (2000).  Wolf shows that the 
industrial structures of the advanced industrial countries have not converged even though aggregate total factor 
productivity and relative factor endowments both have.   Patterns of specialization are divergent, and once set, 
remain stable.     
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Absorbing foreign technology 
  Neoclassical models of trade and economic growth presume not only that production 
functions are known, but that they are identical across countries.  Absent government-imposed 
barriers, once an innovator figures out how to produce something, the same technology quickly 
becomes available for adoption by followers in other countries.
11  In reality, the problem of 
mastering modern production techniques is greatly complicated by the tacit elements in 
technology.  This aspect of technological development is well recognized in discussions of 
technology transfer by development economists and economic historians.  In a survey for the 
Handbook of Development Economics, for example, Evenson and Westphal express the point 
clearly:   
… much of the knowledge about how to perform elementary processes and about how to 
combine them in efficient systems is tacit, not feasibly embodied and neither codifiable 
nor readily transferable.  Thus, though two producers in the same circumstances may use 
identical material inputs in conjunction with equal information, they may nonetheless 
employ what are really two distinct techniques owing to differences in understanding of 
the tacit elements. … Even supposing that [currently existing techniques] represent 
optimal solutions for the circumstances in which they are respectively used, it does not 
follow that they must necessarily be optimal with respect to different circumstances 
where they have not been previously tested….  Once technology is understood in these 
more complex terms, it is quite obvious that investments in technology are made 
whenever it is newly applied, regardless of the novelty of the application.  Learning about 
technology and problem solving using the knowledge acquired in mastering technology 
are not costless, even if the choices made in realizing the technique to be used are 
identical in generic terms to choices previously made elsewhere….  A stream of 
investments over time is typically required to overcome tacitness and thus achieve 
mastery.  Not only is much technology tacit, so too is much knowledge about the 
specifics of local circumstances and about the ways that differences in circumstances 
affect the productivity of particular techniques.  Tacit knowledge can only be acquired 
through investments in learning.… (Evenson and Westphal 1995, 2212-2214)  
 
                                                 
11 There have been some interesting departures from these assumptions in the recent literature.  For example Basu 
and Weil (1998) and Caselli and Coleman (2000) both focus on differences that arise in per-capita GDP due to 
differences in “appropriate technologies.”  However, neither paper considers the role played by uncertainty in 
technology adoption.    
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This lengthy quote expresses well many of the points we have tried to capture in our 
stylized model above.  Entrepreneurs in developing countries who start to produce standardized 
goods that have long been on the scene in more advanced countries are forced to make 
technological investments even though the goods in question may not be new in any sense.  
These investments require discovering the tacit elements of technology and adapting them to the 
local environment.  That in turn entails a process of experimentation and learning.  As Lall puts 
it, “enterprises may not be able to predict if, when, how, and at what cost they would learn 
enough to become fully competitive, even when the technology is well known and mature 
elsewhere” (2000, 17).  There is really no such thing as off-the-shelf technology.   
One of the best-studied cases of technology transfer in economic history concerns the 
cotton textile industry.  Cotton mills in Britain’s Lancashire were the world leader in this 
industry until well into the 20
th century.  The diffusion of technology from Lancashire to other 
regions—India, Japan, the United States—makes for a fascinating story about the role of local 
capabilities in recipient countries.  Lancashire’s technological mastery resided in mule spinning.  
It gave rise not only to British dominance in world markets for cotton textiles, but also to the 
establishment of a capital-goods export industry which sold textile machinery and expertise to 
other countries.  Lancashire firms such as Platt would supply foreign buyers a full technological 
package, complete with equipment, know-how, training, and even managers and skilled workers.  
Thanks to this, countries around the world had in principle access to the “same” technology that 
was available to Lancashire textile producers.  In the case of India, for example, an important 
textile producer in its own right, Clark and Woolcott (2001, 10-11) note that “up to at least the 
1940s there is no sign of any Indian lag in the types of machinery employed compared to the 
advanced economies.”  Yet productivity and profitability in Indian mills remained a fraction of   29
the levels in Lancashire, a failure that Clark and Woolcott attribute to India’s “inability to 
employ the technology effectively” (2000, 10-11).  Saxonhouse and Wright have studied the 
history of the cotton textile industry in detail by analyzing the records of the textile machinery 
exporters from Lancashire.  They too note the heterogeneity in performance across countries 
despite the access to identical technologies, and they observe: “the diversity of experience among 
the newly emerging industries make it clear that progress was a two-sided affair, a mutual 
adaptation between machines and local conditions” (2000, 10). 
Japan, which started out way behind India, was able to overtake India in the early part of 
the 20
th century and become a strong competitor of Britain.  Japanese progress was based not on 
the British mule-spinning technology, but on American-style ring spinning. The story of Japan’s 
cotton textile industry is an intricate one involving both entrepreneurial ingenuity and state 
initiative.  The beginning of the industry can be dated to 1872 when the Meiji government took 
over a small private mill with the intent of making into a model factory that would inspire private 
investment in similar enterprises.  While not a huge commercial success, the factory proved to be 
a major popular attraction: “Such large crowds gathered outside to gawk at the mill that it 
decided to charge a fee of ten sen for a tour” (Fletcher 1996, 53).  The government started more 
model factories, purchased spindles from England, and sold them to local entrepreneurs on very 
easy terms (providing 10-year loans at zero interest) (Fletcher 1996, 54).  The state-initiated 
projects were unable to operate the imported technology efficiently, and after the 1880s the 
government ceased direct assistance to cotton spinning.  It was private firms with independent 
operations and using variants of ring-spinning technology that came to dominate the Japanese 
industry. Saxonhouse and Wright attribute Japan’s success to the Japanese producers’ skill in   30
adapting the American techniques to “an entirely different economic and cultural environment” 
(2000, 10). 
Japan’s experience with steel had many of the same elements.  Early, “off-the-shelf” 
imports of foreign technology during the Meiji period did not produce results until Japanese 
engineers were able to adapt production processes to local conditions.  Odagiri and Goto (1993, 
90-91) describe the Meiji government’s efforts.  In 1874, the Meiji government overrode a local 
engineer’s more modest plans, and built a large steel furnace in Kamaishi using British 
equipment and engineers. The plant had to be closed down after 196 days of operation because 
of problems with local supplies of fuel: charcoal availability was inadequate, and when the fuel 
source was switched to coke, the coke that could be obtained proved to be of poor quality.  The 
plant was restarted several years later after a smaller furnace based on local technology was 
introduced.  When in 1896 the government decided to build an integrated steel mill in Yawata, 
“the lesson of Kamaishi appears to have been forgotten” (Odagiri and Goto 1993, 91).  A 
German company was hired to make the plans, equipment was brought in from Germany, and 
German engineers and managers were put in charge.  But the quality of coke in Japan differed 
from that in Germany, making steel production very difficult.  The mill was forced to shut down 
within a year.  Once again, the plant had to be reconfigured by domestic engineers to make the 
furnaces more appropriate to Japanese coke.       
  The more recent history of East Asian and Latin American countries in the postwar 
period is also replete with experiences that highlight the importance of local adaptation of 
technology.  Amsden (1989, 278) relates the story of Korean shipbuilder Hyundai, which 
established its first shipyard in the early 1970s using imported designs from a Scottish firm 
Scotlithgow.  Because Scotlithgow had small capacity, the Scottish firm’s technique relied on   31
building the two halves of the ship separately, and then putting them together.  When Hyundai 
followed the same approach, trying to replicate all specifications in detail, it turned out that the 
Korean workers could never make the two halves fit just right.  There was more to the 
technology than following the blueprint; the tacit knowledge required in building the ships could 
not be transferred.  Hyundai eventually became the world’s largest shipbuilder, but only after it 
made a large investment in in-house design and research capabilities.   
The Hyundai story is broadly indicative of Korea’s experience with regard to technology 
imports:  “It is a striking fact that formal purchase of technology in complete packages through 
such means as turnkey plant contracts and licensing, plus their functional equivalent—direct 
foreign investment—accounts for only a modest share of the technology that has been mastered 
in Korea…” (Evenson and Westphal 1995, 2263-64).  Similarly, in Taiwan, “activities such as 
imitating, copying, or limited improvement of the existing foreign product (i.e., various reverse 
engineering tactics), were the major sources of acquiring foreign technologies” (Hou and Gee in 
Nelson, 390).   
Even in technologically lagging countries, significant amount tinkering normally takes 
place in order to adapt imported techniques.  In Argentina, “many of the newly erected firms 
found themselves needing to gradually develop ‘in house’ technological capabilities in areas 
such as product design, production engineering, industrial planning, and organization where 
‘from the shelf’ technology was not particularly well suited, given the highly idiosyncratic nature 
of the local production structure” (Katz and Bercovich in Nelson 455; see also Katz and 
Kosacoff 2000).  These instances show how local firms have to engage in a series of 
improvements to enhance productivity even when the technology is standardized and 
implemented in the form of turnkey plants (see also Kim in Nelson 365).  According to Evenson   32
and Westphal (1995, 2241): “Plants established under turnkey projects … often continue years 
later to produce well under their design capacity owing to insufficient local effort to develop the 
requisite production capabilities.”        
 
Domestic spillovers and imitation 
 
  There is a large body of anecdotal evidence on the process of technology diffusion from 
successful first-comers to later imitators. In their review of literature on technology transfer, 
Evenson and Westphal (1995) cite several cases.  They discuss the case of a successful foreign-
owned farm machinery producer in Brazil, which progressively lost market share to indigenous 
producers as the latter first imitated and then adapted the multinational’s models, making them 
better suited to local conditions.  Within twenty years, local firms came to dominate the market 
for all but the most complex models (Evenson and Westphal 1995, 2257).  Another case involves 
rice-threshing technology:   
… the key activity enabling Philippine rice producers to benefit from rice threshing 
technology developed in Japan was the adaptive invention of a prototype thresher at 
IRRI.  Using this prototype, local inventors made the specific adaptations required to 
enable the economic use of threshers in the many different circumstances in which they 
are now used in the Philippines.  (ibid, 2261) 
 
Note that the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is a non-profit, public entity.  Had a 
private producer instead played IRRI’s role, it would have been unable to appropriate much of 
the social returns due to the rapid entry of imitators. 
The diffusion occurs typically, but not exclusively, through the turnover of skilled 
workers and managers who have acquired the requisite expertise on the job.  Indeed, the 
poaching of such employees by later entrants is one of the most important competitive threats 
that pioneering firms face.  The early Japanese experience with cotton textiles again provides an 
interesting illustration.  A private enterprise, Osaka Spinning Co., Ltd., became so profitable in   33
the 1890s that its success “produced fifteen firms more or less modeled upon that firm” 
(Yonekawa 1982, 29).  The high priority that these early investors attached to retaining their 
skilled workers is evident from the statutes of the Japan Spinners Association—the industry 
association that was established in 1882 by the director of one of the early government-owned 
mills: “The most specific provisions [in the Association’s regulations] … aimed at preventing 
firms from raiding skilled workers from each other and from hiring troublemakers” (Yonekawa 
1982, 56).   
The practice of raiding pioneering firms’ workers has not lost its attractions over the 
years.  In Korea, for example, it is the main channel through which technology has diffused 
within the domestic economy.  According to Dahlman et al., when they establish new lines of 
production Korean firms, “simply offer higher salaries to engineers and other technicians from 
other local firms, technicians already skilled in the installation and operation of the new process 
being adopted” (1985, 45).
12  Most late entrants poach personnel from incumbents—initially 
state enterprises and later on other private enterprises—to set up their own facilities (Kim 1993, 
365).  In Taiwan, labor mobility appears to have played a similar role, particularly in diffusing 
technology from the local subsidiaries of foreign firms to other domestic firms (Hou and Gee 
1993, 389).  In the Indian IT industry, poaching of workers by late entrants and employees 
leaving to start their own companies are among the main headaches faced by established firms 
(Lateef 1997, Forbes Global 1998).    
Consider the garment industry in Bangladesh, which is a well-studied case of industrial 
take-off (Rhee 1990).  At the origin of the Bangladeshi garment “miracle” lies a largely 
serendipitous investment made by a local entrepreneur in a joint venture with Dawoo of Korea.  
                                                 
12 As Dahlman et al. note, “such footloose personnel can speed diffusion considerably, but they also discourage 
investments by firms in their human capital” (1985, 45).         
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As Rhee makes clear in his account, few local investors had shown interest in garments, and 
Daewoo did not hold very high hopes for the project either.  (Daewoo’s interest in investing in 
Bangladesh derived from other reasons).  But once the venture, called Desh, proved successful, 
imitation was very rapid: “…115 of the initial corps of 130 workers trained by Daewoo in Korea 
left Desh at different times following the end of the Desh-Daewoo agreement to set up their own, 
often competing, garment exporting firms”  (Rhee 1990, 341).  [See the story of the Mohammadi 
company in the paper.]  As a result, the industry grew from a handful of factories in 1979 to 
more than 700 exporters by 1985 (ibid). The spread of know-how from the workers initially 
trained by Desh was critical—much more so than the availability of capital and other resources.  
Once it became common knowledge that Bangladesh had a profitable market niche in garments, 
the industry took off like a mushroom.  But note as well that, as our previous review of export 
statistics for Bangladesh, has highlighted, the consequence of all this was not a generalized 
enhancement of industrial capacity in manufactures, or even in all types of labor-intensive 
manufactures.  The spillovers to other types of manufacturing seem to have been very limited, 
and Bangladeshi exports remain extremely undiversified.  
  Or consider the Colombian cut flower industry, the story of which is told in Rhee and 
Belot (1990).   How did Colombia get from nowhere to being the largest supplier of cut flowers 
to the U.S.?  Once again, it was a single entrepreneur that was responsible for it all.  Thomas 
Kehler, an American businessman in Colombia, happened to be looking for a business 
opportunity.  He and some partners did a feasibility study, jointly put up an initial investment of 
$100,000, and set up Floramerica in 1969. By 1986, annual sales had risen to $50 million, and 
this produced a tremendous demonstration effect:   
Other companies have copied Floramerica’s production and marketing methods; this 
dynamic process has been facilitated by the movement of key staff who embodied the   35
know-how accumulated at Floramerica…  David Cheever, one of the founders of 
Floramerica, left the company after two years to become a consultant to the growing 
Colombian flower industry.  By assisting in the start-up of many new flower companies, 
he has been a driving force in diffusing know-how accumulated in Floramerica 
throughout the country.  Second, two salesmen at Floramerica’s Miami sales office left 
the company ….” (Rhee and Belot 1990, 31). 
 
By 1990, there were about 250 flower export firms in Colombia, the vast majority of which were 
fully Colombian-owned (ibid).
13     
 
Concluding remarks 
  We have focused here on a neglected aspect of economic development.  Learning what 
one if good at producing is an important determinant of structural change, but it is also one that 
is unlikely to be adequately provided under laissez-faire.  The social returns to such learning are 
likely to be much larger than the private returns, as successful “discoveries” of what can be 
produced at low cost can be easily imitated in general.   
There is a role here for government policy, but it is not a simple one.  Optimal strategies 
have to complement the promotion of “new” activities with the pruning of investments that turn 
out to be high cost ex post.  That in turn requires the government to exercise a certain amount of 
discipline over the private sector.  This is a task at which many governments have proved 
inadequate.  But in the absence of a policy framework that is cognizant of this obstacle, adoption 
of good institutions and openness to foreign technology may well prove insufficient to spark a 
sustained process of economic transformation and growth.   
                                                 
13 For more examples of how competitive industries are often started as a result of efforts by individual 
entrepreneurs who combine vision and expertise, see Rhee and Belot (1990).  Rhee and Belot call these “catalysts.” 
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 Table 1:  Comparison of top 25 export items to the U.S in 2000: Bangladesh and Pakistan (US$ million)
A.  Bangladesh
HS Code and Product Bangladesh exports Pakistan exports
1 620520 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - COTTON 236.2 34.5
2 620342 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 183.9 70.9
3 650590 - HATS AND OTHER HEADGEAR - KNITTED OR FROM TEXTILE MATERIAL NOT IN STRIPS 175.1 0.7
4 620462 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 148.5 17.2
5 030613 - SHRIMPS AND PRAWNS - FROZEN 145.2 7.5
6 620630 - WOMENS/GIRLS BLOUSES, SHIRTS AND SHIRT-BLOUSES - WOVEN - COTTON 141.4 11.4
7 611030 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 123.3 5.6
8 611020 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - COTTON 99.4 284.1
9 620193 - MENS/BOYS ANORAKS, SKI AND WIND JACKETS AND SIMILAR ARTICLES - WOVEN - MAN-MADE FIBRES 82.0 2.6
10 620343 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 61.4 20.0
11 610821 - WOMENS/GIRLS BRIEFS AND PANTIES - KNITTED - COTTON 51.5 0.7
12 620293 - WOMENS/GIRLS ANORAKS, SKI AND WIND JACKETS AND SIMILAR ARTICLES - WOVEN - MAN-MADE FIBRES 48.7 2.4
13 620920 - BABIES GARMENTS (INCL COATS AND SNOWSUITS)  AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES - WOVEN - COTTON 36.9 5.5
14 621111 - MENS/BOYS SWIMWEAR - WOVEN 35.7 0.7
15 621142 - WOMENS/GIRLS COVERALLS, SMOCKS AND GARMENTS NES - WOVEN - COTTON 35.7 24.9
16 620640 - WOMENS/GIRLS BLOUSES, SHIRTS AND SHIRT-BLOUSES - WOVEN - MAN-MADE FIBRES 34.1 0.7
17 620821 - WOMENS/GIRLS PYJAMAS AND NIGHTDRESSES - WOVEN - COTTON 31.6 3.6
18 620530 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - MAN-MADE FIBRES 31.3 2.4
19 620463 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 31.3 6.8
20 630622 - TENTS - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 31.2 0.6
21 620452 - WOMENS/GIRLS SKIRTS AND DIVIDED SKIRTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 25.5 4.5
22 611120 - BABIES GARMENTS (INCL HOSIERY)  AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES - KNITTED - COTTON 23.7 11.7
23 620469 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - TEXTILE NES 23.2 0.9
24 621040 - MENS/BOYS SNOWSUITS AND SIMILAR GARMENTS NES - WOVEN - COATED FABRICS 20.6 0.9
25 610510 - MEN'S/BOYS SHIRTS -  KNITTED - COTTON 20.6 172.4
SUB-TOTAL 1878.1 693.4
OTHERS 540.3 1474.0
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 2418.4 2167.4
B. Pakistan
HS Code and Product Pakistan exports Bangladesh exports
1 611020 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - COTTON 284.1 99.4
2 610510 - MEN'S/BOYS SHIRTS -  KNITTED - COTTON 172.4 20.6
3 630260 - COTTON TERRY TOWELS AND HOUSEHOLD LINEN OF COTTON TERRY FABRICS 138.0 19.6
4 570110 - CARPETS - WOOL/ FINE HAIR - KNOTTED 100.8 0.0
5 630710 - INDUSTRIAL SHOP TOWELS (FLOOR/DISH CLOTHS, DUSTERS AND CLEANING CLOTHS) 85.9 11.1
6 620342 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 70.9 183.9
7 420310 - ARTICLES OF APPAREL OR  CLOTHING  (EXCEPT GLOVES) - LEATHER 70.3 0.0
8 630210 - BEDSHEETS, PILLOWCASES AND BED LINEN (INCL SETS) - KNITTED OR CROCHETED 50.9 0.0
9 520819 - COTTON (>85%) FABRICS - WOVEN NES - UNBLEACHED - <200 G/M2 39.1 0.0
10 610910 - T-SHIRTS, SINGLETS AND OTHER VESTS - KNITTED - COTTON 34.7 14.9
11 620520 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - COTTON 34.5 236.2
12 520812 - COTTON (>85%) FABRICS - PLAIN WEAVE - UNBLEACHED - 100-200 G/M2 32.6 2.7
13 630221 - BEDSHEETS, PILLOWCASES AND BED LINEN (INCL SETS) - WOVEN, PRINTED - COTTON 31.3 4.2
14 630222 - BEDSHEETS, PILLOWCASES AND BED LINEN (INCL SETS) - WOVEN, PRINTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 30.5 0.0
15 711319 - ARTICLES OF JEWELLERY - PRECIOUS METALS (OTHER THAN SILVER) 25.7 0.0
16 621142 - WOMENS/GIRLS COVERALLS, SMOCKS AND GARMENTS NES - WOVEN - COTTON 24.9 35.7
17 520512 - COTTON (>85%) YARN - SINGLE, UNCOMBED 714.29-232.56 DECITEX - NON-RETAIL 24.2 0.0
18 901890 - INSTRUMENTS AND APPLIANCES USED IN MEDICAL, SURGICAL OR VETERINARY SCIENCES NES (INCL PARTS) 24.1 0.0
19 520839 - COTTON (>85%) FABRICS - WOVEN NES - DYED 1 COLOR - <200 G/M2 23.4 0.2
20 950662 - OTHER INFLATABLE BALLS FOR SPORTS 23.2 0.0
21 630392 - CURTAINS (INCL DRAPES), INTERIOR BLINDS AND BED VALANCES - WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 22.6 0.1
22 630231 - BEDSHEETS, PILLOWCASES AND BED LINEN (INCL SETS) - WOVEN, NOT PRINTED - COTTON 21.8 0.0
23 521021 - COTTON (<85%) /MAN-MADE FABRICS - PLAIN WEAVE - BLEACHED - <200 G/M2 21.4 0.0
24 630790 - MADE UP ARTICLES OF TEXTILE MATERIALS NES (INCLUDING DRESS PATTERNS AND SHOE LACES) 20.3 0.7
25 620343 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 20.0 61.4
SUB-TOTAL 1427.7 690.7
OTHERS 739.8 1727.7
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 2167.4 2418.4
Source: Trade Data Online from Industry Canada (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr_homep.html)Table 2:  Comparison of top 25 export items to the U.S in 2000: Honduras and Dominican Republic (US$ million)
A.  Honduras
HS Code and Product Honduras exports
Dominican Republic 
exports 
1 610910 - T-SHIRTS, SINGLETS AND OTHER VESTS - KNITTED - COTTON 499.1 173.7
2 611020 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - COTTON 458.7 118.1
3 620342 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 142.6 493.0
4 610711 - MEN'S/BOYS UNDERWEAR - KNITTED - COTTON 133.1 123.7
5 621210 - BRASSIERES 128.0 144.6
6 610990 - T-SHIRTS, SINGLETS AND OTHER VESTS - KNITTED - TEXTILE NES 122.6 20.8
7 610510 - MEN'S/BOYS SHIRTS -  KNITTED - COTTON 121.0 14.0
8 620520 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - COTTON 112.1 21.6
9 090111 - COFFEE - NOT ROASTED, NOT DECAFFEINATED 97.2 3.2
10 030613 - SHRIMPS AND PRAWNS - FROZEN 83.6 0.4
11 080300 - BANANAS, INCLUDING PLANTAINS - FRESH OR  DRIED 76.1 2.8
12 620462 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 74.7 247.8
13 854430 - IGNITION WIRING SETS AND OTHER WIRING SETS USED FOR VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS 57.9 0.0
14 621010 - RAINCOATS AND GARMENTS NES MADE UP OF TEXTILE FELTS AND NONWOVEN TEXTILE FABRICS 54.8 7.6
15 240210 - CIGARS, CHEROOTS AND CIGARILLOS (CONTAINING TOBACCO) 49.8 191.5
16 610822 - WOMENS/GIRLS BRIEFS AND PANTIES - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 49.6 37.5
17 620343 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 47.9 194.5
18 611030 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 45.8 23.8
19 610821 - WOMENS/GIRLS BRIEFS AND PANTIES - KNITTED - COTTON 45.4 36.3
20 620530 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - MAN-MADE FIBRES 39.0 13.6
21 610462 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS - KNITTED -  COTTON 34.7 19.6
22 030611 - ROCK LOBSTER AND OTHER SEA CRAWFISH - FROZEN 26.4 0.0
23 080719 - MELONS OTHER THAN WATERMELONS - FRESH 22.7 5.9
24 610342 - MEN'S/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS - KNITTED -  COTTON 20.7 18.2
25 620711 - MENS/BOYS UNDERWEAR - WOVEN - COTTON 20.1 2.9
SUB-TOTAL 2563.7 1915.2
OTHERS 526.3 2468.8
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 3090.0 4384.0
B. Dominican Republic
HS Code and Product
Dominican Republic 
exports Honduras  exports
1 620342 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 493.0 142.6
2 901890 - INSTRUMENTS AND APPLIANCES USED IN MEDICAL, SURGICAL OR VETERINARY SCIENCES NES (INCL PARTS) 339.9 0.0
3 620462 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - COTTON 247.8 74.7
4 620343 - MENS/BOYS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 194.5 47.9
5 240210 - CIGARS, CHEROOTS AND CIGARILLOS (CONTAINING TOBACCO) 191.5 49.8
6 610910 - T-SHIRTS, SINGLETS AND OTHER VESTS - KNITTED - COTTON 173.7 499.1
7 621210 - BRASSIERES 144.6 128.0
8 711319 - ARTICLES OF JEWELLERY - PRECIOUS METALS (OTHER THAN SILVER) 142.3 0.0
9 610711 - MEN'S/BOYS UNDERWEAR - KNITTED - COTTON 123.7 133.1
10 640610 - PARTS OF FOOTWEAR - UPPERS (EXCLUDING STIFFENERS) 119.2 0.0
11 611020 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - COTTON 118.1 458.7
12 853620 - AUTOMATIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS - VOLTAGE NOT EXCEEDING 1,000 VOLTS 82.4 0.0
13 170111 - CANE SUGAR - RAW 78.0 4.4
14 720260 - FERRO-NICKEL 70.5 0.0
15 650590 - HATS AND OTHER HEADGEAR - KNITTED OR FROM TEXTILE MATERIAL NOT IN STRIPS 57.0 1.1
16 620333 - MENS/BOYS JACKETS AND BLAZERS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 51.5 2.8
17 853690 - OTHER APPARATUS - FOR SWITCHING, PROTECTING OR CONNECTING ELECTRIC CIRCUITS - NOT EXCEEDING 1,000 V 51.1 0.0
18 850440 - ELECTRIC STATIC CONVERTERS (INCL POWER SUPPLIES, RECTIFIERS AND INVERTERS) 48.3 0.0
19 611592 - SOCKS AND STOCKINGS - KNITTED - COTTON 46.4 11.2
20 620463 - WOMENS/GIRLS TROUSERS, OVERALLS AND SHORTS -  WOVEN - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 42.3 13.2
21 611120 - BABIES GARMENTS (INCL HOSIERY)  AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES - KNITTED - COTTON 38.8 18.0
22 610822 - WOMENS/GIRLS BRIEFS AND PANTIES - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 37.5 49.6
23 610821 - WOMENS/GIRLS BRIEFS AND PANTIES - KNITTED - COTTON 36.3 45.4
24 611241 - WOMEN/GIRL SWIMWEAR - KNITTED - SYNTHETIC FIBRES 34.6 4.2
25 610832 - WOMENS/GIRLS PYJAMAS AND NIGHTDRESSES - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 33.5 3.2
SUB-TOTAL 2996.4 1687.1
OTHERS 1387.6 1402.9
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 4384.0 3090.0
Source: Trade Data Online from Industry Canada (http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr_homep.html)Table 3:  Comparison of top 25 export items to the U.S in 2000: Taiwan and South Korea (US$ million)
A.  Taiwan
HS Code and Product Taiwan exports South Korea exports
1 847130 - PORTABLE COMPUTERS (WEIGHT 10-KG OR LESS) WITH AT LEAST A CPU,  A KEYBOARD AND A DISPLAY 3796.1 320.7
2 847330 - PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING MACHINES (INCL COMPUTERS) AND UNITS THEREOF 3769.2 2824.3
3 854213 - MONOLITHIC DIGITAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS - METAL OXIDE SEMICONDUCTORS (MOS TECHNOLOGY) 3343.0 6525.7
4 847160 - INPUT OR OUTPUT UNITS FOR COMPUTERS AND OTHER DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 1220.7 2236.1
5 854230 - MONOLITHIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS NES (OTHER THAN DIGITAL) 1151.4 586.9
6 852510 - TRANSMISSION APPARATUS - FOR FAX, TELEVISION AND RADIO TRANSMITTERS 908.7 37.4
7 853400 - PRINTED CIRCUITS 895.9 226.9
8 847180 - OTHER UNITS (EXCL STORAGE AND INPUT/OUTPUT UNITS) OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 892.7 112.3
9 851750 - MODEMS AND OTHER APPARATUS FOR CARRIER-CURRENT LINE SYSTEMS OR FOR DIGITAL LINE SYSTEMS NES 614.4 43.0
10 850440 - ELECTRIC STATIC CONVERTERS (INCL POWER SUPPLIES, RECTIFIERS AND INVERTERS) 486.8 62.4
11 852390 - PREPARED UNRECORDED MEDIA FOR SOUND RECORDING OR OTHER PHENOMENA (EXCL CINEMATOGRAPHY) NES 447.7 6.7
12 611030 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 385.7 366.5
13 731815 - OTHER BOLTS OR SCREWS NES (WITH OR WITHOUT THEIR NUTS OR WASHERS) - IRON OR STEEL 318.4 20.6
14 846591 - SAWING MACHINES FOR WORKING WOOD, CORK, BONE. HARD RUBBER, HARD PLASTICS OR SIMILAR HARD MATERIALS 286.6 0.0
15 871200 - BICYCLES AND OTHER CYCLES 278.8 0.6
16 848180 - TAPS, COCKS, VALVES AND OTHER SIMILAR APPLIANCES, NES 277.7 74.4
17 950691 - ARTICLES AND EQUIPMENT FOR EXERCISE, GYMNASTICS AND ATHLETICS 271.0 4.1
18 731814 - THREADED SELF-TAPPING SCREWS - IRON OR STEEL 260.9 3.9
19 847170 - STORAGE UNITS FOR COMPUTERS AND OTHER DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 229.9 826.8
20 853669 - ELECTRICAL PLUGS AND SOCKETS - FOR VOLTAGE NOT EXCEEDING 1, 000 VOLTS 215.4 18.0
21 940320 - METAL FURNITURE NOT FOR OFFICE USE 206.2 14.5
22 731816 - NUTS - IRON OR STEEL 203.0 13.7
23 847150 - DIGITAL PROCESSING UNITS WITH OR WITHOUT REST OF SYSTEM 202.2 1245.3
24 940360 - WOODEN FURNITURE FOR OTHER USE 193.1 8.5
25 852540 - STILL IMAGE VIDEO CAMERAS AND OTHER VIDEO CAMERA RECORDERS 189.4 271.2
SUB-TOTAL 21045.0 15850.5
OTHERS 19469.2 24449.8
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 40514.2 40300.3
B. South Korea
HS Code and Product South Korea exports Taiwan exports
1 854213 - MONOLITHIC DIGITAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS - METAL OXIDE SEMICONDUCTORS (MOS TECHNOLOGY) 6525.7 3343.0
2 870323 - MOTOR VEHICLES - SPARK IGNITION - CYLINDER CAPACITY 1500-3000 CC 4281.3 0.4
3 852520 - TRANSMISSION/RECEPTION APPARATUS - FOR CB/AMATEUR RADIOS, FAX, CELLULAR PHONES AND THE LIKE 2916.3 58.2
4 847330 - PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING MACHINES (INCL COMPUTERS) AND UNITS THEREOF 2824.3 3769.2
5 847160 - INPUT OR OUTPUT UNITS FOR COMPUTERS AND OTHER DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 2236.1 1220.7
6 847150 - DIGITAL PROCESSING UNITS WITH OR WITHOUT REST OF SYSTEM 1245.3 202.2
7 847170 - STORAGE UNITS FOR COMPUTERS AND OTHER DATA PROCESSING MACHINES 826.8 229.9
8 271000 - PREPARATIONS OF/NON-CRUDE PETROLEUM OILS AND OILS OBTAINED FROM BITUMINOUS MINERALS 599.9 1.1
9 854230 - MONOLITHIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS NES (OTHER THAN DIGITAL) 586.9 1151.4
10 870322 - MOTOR VEHICLES - SPARK IGNITION - CYLINDER CAPACITY 1000-1500 CC 542.8 0.0
11 851650 - MICROWAVE OVENS - DOMESTIC 486.8 0.6
12 611030 - SWEATERS, SWEATSHIRTS AND WAIST-COATS - KNITTED - MAN-MADE FIBRES 366.5 385.7
13 847130 - PORTABLE COMPUTERS (WEIGHT 10-KG OR LESS) WITH AT LEAST A CPU,  A KEYBOARD AND A DISPLAY 320.7 3796.1
14 852540 - STILL IMAGE VIDEO CAMERAS AND OTHER VIDEO CAMERA RECORDERS 271.2 189.4
15 841510 - AIR CONDITIONING MACHINES (AIR CONDITIONERS)  - WINDOW OR WALL TYPES, SELF-CONTAINED 262.6 1.2
16 620530 - MENS/BOYS SHIRTS - WOVEN  - MAN-MADE FIBRES 257.9 18.0
17 852190 - VIDEO RECORDING OR REPRODUCING APPARATUS - EXCLUDING MAGNETIC TAPE-TYPE 235.9 16.5
18 853400 - PRINTED CIRCUITS 226.9 895.9
19 852990 - PARTS (EXCLUDING AERIALS)  FOR RADIO, TELEVISION, RADAR AND OTHER SIMILAR APPARATUS 187.4 123.0
20 401110 - NEW PNEUMATIC TIRES OF RUBBER - FOR USE ON MOTOR CARS (INCL STATION WAGONS AND RACING CARS) 181.1 43.6
21 852110 - VIDEO RECORDING OR REPRODUCING APPARATUS - MAGNETIC TAPE TYPE 172.5 6.3
22 870899 - OTHER MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS NES 148.2 150.7
23 481011 - PAPER (WOODFREE) - COATED - FOR WRITING/PRINTING - <150 G/M2 143.8 2.8
24 841430 - COMPRESSORS OF A KIND USED IN REFRIGERATING EQUIPMENT 139.0 17.2
25 847149 - OTHER COMPUTERS OR DIGITAL AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING UNITS PRESENTED IN THE FORM OF SYSTEMS 131.1 87.5
SUB-TOTAL 26117.3 15710.6
OTHERS 14183.1 24803.6
TOTAL (ALL PRODUCTS) 40300.3 40514.2
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Honduras
Dominican Rep.
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Taiwan
S. Korea
Germany